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Abstract
In Africa, the decade of the nineteen nineties was characterised by civil war 
and interstate conflict, but as the decade came to a close and a new millennium 
emerged many of the protracted conflicts in Africa had officially come to 
an end. The official resolution of conflict in Sierra Leone, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire has helped stem 
the rampant instability that has plagued the continent for most of its post-
colonial history. With the newly established peace agreements comes an 
even more critical and difficult challenge of creating peaceful societies in 
these war-ravaged nations. In order to rebuild a nation, one must examine 
and acknowledge the root causes of the conflict. One of the most prevalent 
and underrepresented root causes of conflict in Africa and worldwide is that 
of horizontal inequalities. In that light, the goal of this paper is to provide 
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practical solutions for the long-term resolution of conflict by addressing one 
of its root causes, that of horizontal inequalities. Reference will be made to 
solutions proven successful in past cases where conflict emerged as a result 
of group inequalities, namely Rwanda and Mali. The paper will take the 
following form: Section one will look at the current literature on conflict 
and demonstrate the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict. 
Section two will focus on the two case studies providing background to 
the conflict, and the action taken after violent conflict ceased. Section three 
will be dedicated to the lessons learned from the Malian and the Rwandan 
experience, including policy recommendations that should be instituted for 
any nation where horizontal inequalities are a major catalyst of conflict.
Introduction
As a new century dawned there was a renewed sense that the international 
community would be able to quell the many conflicts and threats to peace 
that exist around the world; however, by the autumn of 2001 that hope 
was drastically altered. With the events of September 11th, the overthrow 
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq, the much 
heralded Millennium Development Goals and the commitment to assisting 
those in the most dire of circumstances fell to the wayside in the name of 
national security. This new national security and terrorist agenda, which 
has been championed by the United States (US), remains the focus of the 
international community almost seven years after the terrorist attacks 
occurred. The international attention paid to both Iraq and transnational 
terrorist organisations has resulted in a departure from the humanitarian and 
individual focused security agenda that was beginning to emerge. However, 
while the US and most of the rest of the world is fixated on Al-Qaeda and 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), progress towards peace and stability has 
developed in one of the more unstable regions of the world – Sub-Saharan 
Africa. There are now peace agreements in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if successful, these developments 




The problems the US is encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan and the long 
road ahead for the many African nations emerging from conflict illustrate 
the multitude of challenges that accompany nation building. In this light, 
one of the most pressing questions the international community must 
answer is: How can nations emerging from conflict create sustainable peace 
and stability? The answers to this question have global relevance, but the 
solutions are especially necessary in Africa where, since the independence 
movement of the 1960s, conflict has ensued with regard to every imaginable 
nature. The formal peace agreements emerging in many nations are the 
starting point of a long process, but that process’s validity and success lies in 
solving the root causes of violent conflict. Even though the cultures, regions 
and people involved in these conflicts are exceedingly complex the conflicts, 
in and of themselves, have one similarity: they are a result of domestic 
horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are inequalities between 
groups and can be attributed to conflicts in all parts of the world – from 
the US race riots in the 1960’s and the 2005 Paris riots to the genocides that 
unfolded in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, if countries 
and regions in Africa and the rest of the world want to develop stable peaceful 
societies they must rectify the horizontal inequalities that are at the root of 
many violent conflicts. 
The ability of a nation to resolve inequalities between groups is of the utmost 
importance in any peace process. Thankfully, the international community 
and nations that are embarking on this process have a history and past 
experience to guide future action. In order to answer the question of how 
African nations and regions emerging from conflict can create sustainable 
peace and stability, this paper will analyse the steps African nations have taken 
to rectify horizontal inequalities in post-conflict environments. This analysis 
is constructed upon two case studies, Mali and Rwanda, and will provide 
lessons for future peace initiatives in Africa and beyond. Furthermore, this 
paper will provide an in-depth analysis with a focus on successful initiatives, 
something often ignored in circulating literature. The goal of this paper is 
to provide practical solutions for the long-term resolution of conflict by 
addressing one of its root causes, that of horizontal inequalities. Moreover, 
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it will provide solutions proven successful in past cases regarding conflicts 
caused by group inequalities. 
Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict
In order to understand the mechanisms needed to create peace, the reasons 
for the development of conflict must be understood. There exists in the 
international community the idea that conflict resolution is necessary 
and possible, however, it should also be understood that conflict should 
not be viewed as something intrinsically negative. Victor Azarya argues 
that conflict is natural and cannot be prevented. Because conflict cannot 
be eliminated, he further argues that conflict can only be contained and 
moderated (Azarya 2003:3). What the international community must 
aim to achieve is the elimination of violent conflict, not conflict in and of 
itself. Once this is understood the question then revolves around conflict 
management and violence prevention. The most effective way to preventing 
violent conflict is to address the root causes of conflict. Azarya argues that a 
democracy is the preferred mechanism to contain conflict because it is the 
‘art of conflict accommodation’ (Azarya 2003:4). Democracy provides room 
for disagreement without having to resort to violence. Mark Malloch Brown, 
Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), is also a proponent 
of democracy promotion stating, ‘It is my strong belief that democratic 
governance is vital not just for ensuring sustainable development, but is 
vital for sustaining peace within societies’ (Brown 2003:142). The greatest 
impediment to democracy, however, is that democratic governance will 
only work if all parties deem it legitimate. The goal of democracy as a tool 
for stability must be predicated on the full involvement of all parties and 
groups. It must also be recognised that while the theory of democratic 
reconstruction is appealing, instituting it is proving to be very difficult in 
practice (Ottaway 2003:315). 
Other authors including Vamik Volkan argue that the root causes of many 
protracted conflicts are the result of ethnicity. He states, that at the ‘root 




ethnicity causing conflict is normally divided into two different theories: 
constructivism and primordialism. The former views ethnicity as a fluid 
social construct and the latter views ethnicity as something that one is born 
into and that cannot be easily altered. Violence often develops between ethnic 
groups when one group feels threatened or harmed by the other, usually as a 
result of some inequality or perception of inequality. 
Still others, including Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2006), Thomas Homer-Dixon 
(1999) and Robert Kaplan (1994) view population pressures as the root of 
many conflicts. Said Adejumobi takes the conflict argument in a different 
direction, citing the denial of citizenship rights as major cause of conflict. 
Adejumobi (2001:156) states: 
It is the consciousness of the denial of citizenship rights by a 
people, which usually facilitates the transformation of sectarian 
groups, like racial and ethnic groups, from being ‘groups 
in themselves’ into ‘groups for themselves.’ The idea of elite 
mobilization of ethnic or racial ideology, which most analysts 
emphasize in explaining politics and conflicts in Africa, is 
only possible in the context of a fertile ground of citizenship 
exclusion.
The exclusion of people, often groups, from aspects of citizenship 
creates systemic exclusion, inequalities and animosities that foster group 
mobilisation and violent conflict.
The control and exploitation of resources, it is argued, is a major contributor 
to violent group mobilisation. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler assert that 
civil conflict can be articulated as a greed versus grievance dynamic where 
rebellions start because of the greed of leaders or because of genuine grievance 
of the people. However, because rebels must finance their rebellion, the 
control of resources becomes an impediment for peace (Collier & Hoeffler 
2001). This dichotomy of either greed or grievance is troublesome to Karen 
Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke of the International Peace Academy. They 
state, ‘conflict analysis models should avoid “resource reductionist models” 
in favor of comprehensive approaches’ (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2003:1). 
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James Busumtwi-Sam also advocates a more comprehensive approach for 
explaining conflict. He states that there are three interrelated factors that 
contribute to protracted conflict: ‘contests over the state and the distribution 
of political power, the distribution of membership in the political community 
and the distribution of values and resources’ (Busumtwi-Sam 2002:94). 
Considering a multitude of inequalities when explaining conflict creates a 
more complete understanding of conflict and leaves us better equipped to 
rebuild a state. 
One of the most cited sources of inequality is poverty and, as a result, an 
increased level of violence is attributed to high levels of poverty. Ted Robert 
Gurr argued that rebellions occur when a large discrepancy exists between 
people’s legitimate and actual levels of material reward (Gurr 1970). Nicholas 
Sambanis (2004:202) demonstrates that a robustly inverted relationship exists 
between the per capita income and political violence. It should be noted that 
because of the need for group mobilisation, the disparity in income must 
occur between groups if there is to be any occurrence of violent conflict. The 
argument that income disparity between people and groups creates violent 
conflict can be included in the larger idea of the dissolution of the social 
contract. Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed argue that conflict can be 
viewed as a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract (Addison 
& Murshed 2001:2).1
Many scholars have theorised and articulated what they view as causes 
of conflict; notably, they all directly or indirectly point to the inequalities 
between individuals and groups. This realisation will help guide further 
discussion on how to reduce the impact of both vertical (between individuals) 
and horizontal (between groups) inequalities. A number of scholars have 
addressed the question of inequalities. Frances Stewart, for example, deals 
with the problem of horizontal inequalities in a number of papers.2 Stewart 
(2002:3) argues that ‘unequal access to political/economic/social resources 
1 The social contract can be seen as the implicit rules that govern the distribution of 
resources and duties in an organised society. 





by different cultural groups can reduce individual welfare…[and] where 
there are such inequalities in resource access and outcomes, coinciding with 
cultural differences, culture can become a powerful mobilizing agent’. Stewart 
recognises that it is not only the underprivileged that can become violent; 
groups benefiting from the current system may also resort to violence if 
they feel their access to resources is threatened (as happened in Rwanda). 
The focus on group inequalities is important because in order to have a 
large-scale violent outbreak groups of individuals must mobilise. Moreover, 
the relative position of groups within society is a determinate factor in 
stability, not the absolute position of the individual. As Cohen (1974:94) 
articulates, ‘when men do fight…they fight over some fundamental issues 
concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, 
political, or social’. One’s cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious differences 
will not create conflict unless there are extreme political or economic issues 
within a society. Consequently, the greater the horizontal inequalities, 
be they political, social, or economic, the greater the chance for violent 
conflict to emerge. Gudrum Østby (2005:23) adds to the idea of horizontal 
inequalities as a determinant of conflict by showing that ‘recent studies of 
the inequality-conflict nexus may be wrong when concluding that inequality 
is unrelated’. Furthermore, Østby (2006) establishes a relationship between 
conflict and severe socio-economic horizontal inequalities. The prevalence 
of systemic and pervasive horizontal inequalities within societies has led to 
the destruction and underdevelopment of numerous societies; however, the 
issue of group inequalities continues to lack substantial attention within 
academia and, more importantly, within the international development 
agenda. 
In order to foster stability and development, societies that have experienced 
conflict as a result of horizontal inequalities must find a way to resolve these 
disparities. Much of the literature on conflict revolves around theoretical 
approaches without advancing applicable solutions. As a way of gaining 
insight into how to bridge the gap between theory and application, an 
analysis of how post-conflict states have addressed the problem of horizontal 
inequalities follows. 
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Case Studies: Mali and Rwanda
Mali
With a landmass of 1.24 million square kilometres (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2006) and a human development index of 175 (United Nations 
Development Programme 2006), the country of Mali is one the largest 
and most underdeveloped countries in Africa. From 1990 to 1996 the 
government of Mali was confronted with a secessionist movement instigated 
by a northern nomadic population called the Tuareg. Trained by Libya, the 
Tuareg formed the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPLA) with the 
goal of gaining independence for the Azawad region in Northern Mali. 
The conflict ‘took place in the vast desert and mountains regions of the far 
north of the country a region – referred to as the ‘‘Azawad’’ by the rebel 
movements – constituting two thirds of the national territory but relatively 
poor in natural resources’ (Humphreys & Mohamed 2007:6). The country 
is bisected by the Niger River with the north of the country lying in the 
Sahara Desert and the south lying in a more arable and temperate climate. 
This climatic disparity is responsible for the smaller population in the north 
as well as for its economic irrelevance. The roots of the Malian conflict can 
be seen as a combination of ethnic fighting between the black population 
of the south and the paler northern population coupled with northern 
economic grievances (Economist 1990). Moreover, the systematic neglect, 
discrimination and exploitation of the northern provinces added to the 
Tuareg grievances against the government (Lode 1997). Almost immediately 
after the beginning of the conflict in 1991, the government of Moussa Traoré 
agreed to negotiate with the northern rebels. The talks, which took place 
in Algeria, resulted in the Tamanrasset Accords. These Accords as well as 
the Traoré government, however, proved fragile. On 26 March 1991 Moussa 
Traoré was overthrown. The new transitional government worked quickly 
to foster acceptance of the Tamanrasset Accords, but did not achieve any 
substantial success. Because the Accords were unpopular with the army, the 
rebels and the citizenry, and suffered from imprecise construction, they were 




installation of a new government instilled the population and the belligerents 
with a renewed sense that peace could be legitimately achieved. ‘The [failed] 
Tamanrasset Accords of 6 January 1991 provided a starting point for the 
dialogue that would eventually lead to a settlement’ (Storholt 2001:334). On 
11 April 1992 the National Pact was signed by three of the four rebel factions, 
but ‘the Tuaregs continued to resist central authority until 1996 when Konaré 
(democratically elected in 1992) brought the rebellion to a close through 
negotiations and promises of administrative reform’ (Smith 2001:75). On 
27 March 1996 the peace process was celebrated by the burning of 3,000 
firearms which was attended by both government officials and rebel leaders 
and marked the end of the six-year conflict (University of Maryland 2007). 
Horizontal inequalities between the Northern and Southern populations 
were the root cause of the Malian conflict. As a result of a concerted effort to 
resolve the horizontal inequalities, governmental stability has increased and 
violence has ceased between the two groups.
The Tamanrasset Accords, while imprecise and unpopular, were the basis 
for the National Pact, which eventually led to peace. The National Pact had 
many similarities with the Tamanrasset Accords. However, its construction 
was more holistic, reasonable and confronted the roots of the Malian 
conflict. The National Pact, signed in April 1992, included ‘integration of 
Tuareg combatants into the Malian armed forces, demilitarization of the 
north, economic integration of northern populations and a more detailed 
administrative structure for the three northern regions’ (Seely 2001:507). 
The National Pact, unlike other agreements, went to great lengths to explicitly 
recognise the economic marginalisation of the northern populations. 
Moreover, in a speech on 9 November 1991 Col. Toumani Touré recognised 
that ‘all Malians, including people in the North, should have the same 
rights and should be treated equally’ (Storholt 2001:341). Furthermore, 
‘He admitted that the Malian government had done wrong in the past and 
officially apologized to the people of the north’ (Storholt 2001:342). The 
recognition of economic and political neglect helped foster an environment 
of cooperation, while demonstrating governmental willingness to first admit 
to and then rectify past actions. The peace process was aided in part because 
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the new government was willing to engage all sectors of society in order 
to create a more democratic and progressive society. The willingness of the 
government to admit wrongdoing and the inclusion of the northerners 
in the military, governmental, and economic sectors of society along 
with a proactive reform agenda of decentralisation paved the way for the 
northerners and the government to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 
The Tuareg’s secessionist-centred goal was rectified by the transitional 
and the permanent government’s policy of decentralisation. The policy of 
decentralisation was originally confined to the north; but ‘shortly after taking 
office in the newly democratic Malian Republic…President Alpha Oumar 
Konaré decided to implement a nation-wide policy of decentralization’ 
(Seely 2001:495). This policy allocated administrative and fiscal control over 
health, education and some infrastructure to the local communes (Seely 
2001). The decentralisation of the country, especially the north, had a three-
part effect. The government was able to consolidate power, gain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public and the dissidents, and mitigate the threat from 
the north. The promises of economic and political inclusion, as well as 
decentralised rule was strengthened by the government’s political will to 
follow through with the agreed framework. 
The last major incident which helped to create a workable and ultimately 
successful peace plan was the development by both sides of what I. William 
Zartman (1995:18) called ‘hurting stalemate’. He writes, ‘Negotiations 
take place when both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and 
see an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving satisfaction through 
accommodation.’ In Mali, both parties to the conflict recognised they had more 
to gain through dialogue than through violence. In fact, ‘what characterized 
the peace process in Mali was first the will to find a peaceful solution, and 
second, a strategy for managing the conflict’ (Storholt 2001:334). The conflict 
in Mali came to a resolution while the new government was attempting 
to regain control and legitimacy throughout the country. As a result, they 
managed to end the six-year conflict while developing a democracy that has 
‘found firm support in recent economic growth, social structures conducive 




and effective political leadership’ (Smith 2001:73). Mali’s successful peace 
process can be attributed to a responsive government admitting past neglect, 
a peace accord that addressed the root causes of conflict i.e. economic and 
political horizontal inequalities between the north and the south, and 
the advent of a ‘decentralized administration that gave real authority to 
previously voiceless local governments’ (Pringle 2006:33).
Rwanda
In the summer of 1994, Rwanda, a ‘quite scenic country in Central Africa, 
whose very nature exudes serenity became the venue of the cruellest butchery 
ranking among the biggest tragedies of the 20th century’ (Dulian 2004:40). 
The Rwandan genocide of over 800,000 Tutsis came as the result of historic 
and modern inequalities between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. 
The deep animosities that have plagued Rwandan politics are rooted in the 
historical management of colonialism. Relations between Hutu and Tutsi 
have always been one of status. However, historically, the lines between the 
two distinctions were fluid and changeable and the two groups had much in 
common. The Hutu and Tutsi ‘developed a single and highly sophisticated 
language, Kinyarwanda, crafted a common set of religious and philosophical 
beliefs, and created a culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric’ 
(Human Rights Watch 1999:1). In pre-colonial Rwanda, power was attained 
by the acquisition of cattle and because the Tutsi were primarily pastoralists, 
they became the elite class within Rwandan society. This was an informal 
process resulting in a system by which both groups could attain power, and 
where class mobility and intermarriage existed (Shah 2003:2). Even though 
the ‘minority Tutsi dominated over the Hutu… it was Belgium, which after 
taking control from Germany following World War I, institutionalized Tutsi 
dominance and solidified these divisions through the issuance of ethnic 
identity cards’ (Kuperman 1996:223). The institutionalisation of Hutu 
and Tutsi as distinct people introduced for the first time the idea of race. 
Moreover, the colonialists developed the so-called Hamitic hypothesis which 
held that the Tutsi and everything humanly superior in Central Africa came 
from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia. Because of the solidification of identity as 
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the main determinant of access and power and because the Tutsis were seen 
as more European, they became the privileged minority in a nation that was 
becoming more stratified. What evolved in Rwanda was the development 
of two distinct identities. The Hutu was an identity of subjugation and 
the Tutsi was an identity of power. While membership as a Tutsi did not 
necessarily result in power, it did grant them exemption from the most cruel 
and degrading treatment reserved for the Hutu population. By the end of 
the colonial era, Rwanda was a nation defined by identity. The Hutu saw the 
Tutsis as oppressors and foreigners, a distinction that would play a huge role 
in post-colonial Rwanda.
Between independence and the 1994 genocide, Rwanda had two successive 
Hutu republics. The opportunity to eradicate the system of rigid identity 
instituted under colonialism was at hand, however, ‘the 1959 revolution 
turned the world colonialism created upside down; but it did not change…
instead of challenging the identities [the new government]…embraced 
them’ (Mamdani 2002:500). The sixty years of colonialism and Tutsi rule 
‘inflated Tutsi egos inordinately and crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced 
into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex’ (Magnarella 2003:25). 
During the first republic under Kayibanda, many Tutsi fled to surrounding 
nations, including Uganda. Those that remained in Rwanda faced widespread 
oppression and a violence that was not only accepted, but rewarded. This 
violence was realised during the first republic, where intermittent massacres 
of Rwandan Tutsi occurred in 1963, 1967 and 1973 (Kuperman 1996:223). 
The development of the second republic was the result of a 1973 coup 
orchestrated by General Juvenal Habyarimana. Under the second republic 
‘Habyarimana officially redefined Tutsi from a race into an ethnic group…
with political rights and with proportional representation in parliament, 
in embassies, in the cabinet, even in the army’ (Mamdani 2002:500). The 
second republic’s attempt to rectify and put the past to rest was tempered 
by opposition Hutus residing outside of northern Rwanda. The new regime 
‘went to great lengths to integrate Tutsi elements into society and publicly 
stressed the need for national reconciliation’ (Fujii 2004:101). However, the 




during the first republic, and the minority Hutu, who occupied the north. 
With General Habyarimana’s successful coup the economic, political, and 
military power in Rwanda shifted to northern Hutus, which engendered 
aversion from the Hutu as well as Tutsi (Kuperman 2000:95). The most 
contentious issue, which brought about the 1990 civil war, was the issue 
of the Tutsi refugees residing in Uganda. ‘Habyarimana adamantly refused 
to allow their (Tutsi refugees) return, insisting that Rwanda was already 
too crowded and had too little land, jobs and food for them’ (Magnarella 
2003:26). As a result of the problems with the Ugandan and the Rwandan 
governments’ handling of refugees, ‘an expatriate rebel force composed 
mainly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), 
invaded northern Rwanda’ (Kuperman 2000:95). The civil war between the 
government and rebels lasted until 1993 when the Arusha Accords, a power-
sharing agreement between the Hutu government and the Tutsi refugees/
rebels, was signed in 1993. 
The Arusha Accords were under-funded and operated on an unrealistic 
timetable that was unable to appease the more extremist factions within the 
Hutu power structure. The northern Hutu under Habyarimana controlled 
political patronage, and dominated the civil service, both key sources of 
power (Kuperman 1996:223-224). The entrenched political elite of the 
north ‘viewed the accords as abject surrender to the Tutsi, who they feared 
would seize the spoils of rule and seek retribution’ (Kuperman 2000:96). As 
President Habyarimana was taking steps to ensure the implementation of 
Arusha, his plane was shot down on 6 April 1994. This acted as the trigger for 
Hutu extremists focused on retaining control of Rwanda to enact a campaign 
of genocide against the Tutsi population (Human Rights Watch 1995). The 
sudden and mysterious death of the Rwandan president set in motion one 
hundred days of horror that decimated the Tutsi population and led to the 
overthrow of the second republic when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)3 
took Kigali and instituted a unilateral ceasefire and a return to Tutsi rule. 
3 Within the organisation of the rebel movement the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was 
the military arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). For an in-depth analysis of the 
history and evolution of the RPF refer to Reed 1996:479-501 and Kuperman 2004:61-84. 
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The genocide in Rwanda was the result of deep and systemic horizontal 
inequalities within the political, economic and military sectors of society. 
The inequalities were suffered by both ‘identities’ and resulted in widespread 
violence against both Hutu and Tutsi. These inequalities and the thirst for 
power, coupled with systemic social and economic insecurity, bred extremism 
which resulted in one of the most efficient and most deadly violent outbreaks 
of the modern era. In post-genocide Rwanda, the transitional government 
and the elected Tutsi leadership took many steps to rectify the deep divide 
brought upon by the events that took place in the spring and summer 
of 1994.
With the end of the genocide and the ‘victory’ of the RPF, Rwanda was in 
the hands of the minority Tutsi who were the majority of the genocide 
victims and the traditional oppressors within Rwandan society. With the 
inception of a new government the opportunity to change the system of 
domination and inequality was again at hand. The new RPF government 
came to power with two core priorities, the fostering of national 
reconciliation and the reduction of poverty (Zorbas 2004:37). The ability 
of the new government to accomplish these two goals will be instrumental 
in developing a peaceful and stable Rwanda. In a relatively short period, 
the national unity government accomplished a great deal, including the 
fostering of stability, developing the foundations for rule-of-law, aiding 
in the emergence of democratic and civil society and overseeing the 
normalisation of the financial sector (Dulian 2004). While democratic 
structures must be developed and rule-of-law must reign supreme, the 
government must resolve the issues that created the outburst of violence 
in the first place, namely economic and political exclusion. The president’s 
call for ‘prioritization of poverty reduction in all government programs’ 
(Zorbas 2004:37) is a step in the right direction. The reduction of poverty 
will not only create stability, it will aid in the reconciliation process by 
giving those affected by the genocide the means to begin life anew. The 
government has also abolished the identity cards that did so much to 
stratify the society, stressing the idea of being a Rwandan not a Hutu or 




beginning to emerge is a victim/perpetrator mentality which is making the 
deconstruction of the Hutu/Tutsi identity extremely difficult. Additionally, 
‘despite the government’s insistence that ethnic divisions are a thing of the 
past, there is nothing to indicate that local communities accept this policy 
as anything more than naïve political rhetoric’ (Tiemessen 2004:65). It 
must be recognised that obtaining local support for this policy will only 
be gained in time and should be seen as a very important step to creating 
equality. The abolition of official identity and the government’s recognition 
that poverty must be a priority are steps in the right direction. There are 
three issues, however, that must be addressed if Rwanda is to have a stable 
and peaceful future: reconciliation, property and governance.
Reconciliation is the cornerstone of the Rwandan government’s strategy 
to heal from the genocide. Currently there are about 120,000 people in 
custody for genocide charges. The severity of the charges range from 
being a chief architect of the genocide to people charged with looting and 
vandalising (International Crisis Group 1999:6). The main perpetrators 
of the genocide are being tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), but the government retains responsibility for trying the 
majority of the ordinary killers. Given the poor condition of the Rwandan 
legal system, its ability to perform these duties is highly questionable. The 
government lacks a functioning court system, it is suffering from huge 
delays in setting up trial mechanisms, and it lacks adequate detention 
facilities to house the 120,000 prisoners.
The process of reconciliation is structured on three parts: the ICTR, 
domestic trials, and Gacaca. The first two divisions of reconciliation focus 
on retributive justice (that of punishment), while the third operates under 
restorative justice (that of healing and trust building). The ability of the 
government to accommodate the large number of perpetrators and the 
ability of the Gacaca trials to succeed has been called into question mainly 
because of a lack of resources and of the length of time needed to perform 
these trials. The process of reconciliation is not having the effects that the 
post-genocide government would have liked. This is, in part, the result of 
the massive trauma inflicted upon the entire country; but there are also 
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issues of victor’s justice and the lack of equal punishment that continue to 
hinder national reconciliation. 
The hard-handed control maintained by the RPF since its military victory 
in 1994 has led many to view the reconciliation process as victor’s justice, 
creating greater animosities as the process of reconciliation is enacted. The 
perceived inequality of justice will destroy any legitimacy that the RPF 
would have attained and will contribute to the disunity of the country, 
making renewed conflict more likely. 
The basis of the genocide hearings are in the Organic Law, which ‘stipulates 
a jurisdiction over crimes committed between October 1990 and December 
1994, including both the civil war and the genocide’ (Tiemessen 2004:70). 
In that light, all illegal acts and perpetrators could be charged and punished; 
however, this has not happened. The new, primarily Tutsi government, 
has only been arresting and trying Hutus that committed crimes, without 
holding Tutsis accountable. During the years of Organic Law jurisdiction, 
the Tutsi were allegedly guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The crimes included the forcible displacement of Hutu populations, 
moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, the RPF ‘destroyed property, 
recruited child soldiers against their will, and displaced thousands in order 
to create free fire zones’ (Human Rights Watch 1994:13). In order for any 
type of reconciliation to occur, whether based on retribution or restoration, 
both sides of a conflict must atone for their actions. Until the government 
of Rwanda holds soldiers and civilians guilty of crimes against the Hutu 
accountable, reconciliation will be impossible. Unless all proceedings are 
viewed as neutral and impartial, the reconciliation that is so sorely needed 
will never develop and Rwanda will be a country in the ‘pursuit of justice 
without reconciliation’ (Lemarchand 1998:13).
Property continues to be a contentious issue. Rwanda is the most densely 
populated country in Africa, and as a result issues of property are 
continuously creating issues of insecurity. In Rwanda, according to Human 
Rights Watch (1995), the ‘atmosphere of insecurity was…heightened by 




genocide era such a contentious issue and because property issues were a 
major cause of animosity and insecurity (Fisiy 1998:24), the government 
must address this property issue. The main ‘policy documents [regarding 
land] in circulation…aim to ensure food security and to increase off-
farm income’ (Van Hoyweghen 1999:367). The two-part focus will help 
to ensure that basic food needs are met while providing income-earning 
opportunities separate from agriculture. The need for land reform is 
evident to not only deal with the large population, but to help reintegrate 
refugees back into Rwandan society. The government continues to take 
strides to deal with land because it is ‘widely believed that the problem 
[of development for peace and stability] can only be settled by major 
agrarian…reform’ (Van Hoyweghen 1999:365). 
Governance in Rwanda has for its entire modern history been that of 
inequality and repression, which led in large part to the events of 1994. In 
the post-genocide era the new government must develop an inclusive and 
representative government; but this has yet to take hold. The mainly Tutsi 
government is once again failing to address the structural inequalities that 
have led to so much bloodshed over the decades. Instead of taking a holistic 
approach to development; the current government ‘is prioritizing economic 
and social rights while ignoring civil and political rights’ (International 
Crisis Group 2002:2). In fact, ‘police control over all forms of opposition, 
both within and outside the regime, has steadily increased [and] the 
press, associations and opposition parties have been silenced, destroyed, 
or co-opted’ (International Crisis Group 2002:1). The lack of progress in 
governance is making violence an ‘increasingly attractive option, which in 
turn fuels security pressures on the regime’ (International Crisis Group 
2002:2). However all is not lost; President Kagame has declared that all 
presidential and legislative elections will be carried out by direct universal 
suffrage and through secret ballot. Moreover, ‘the Rwandan government 
has made efforts towards reconciliation including the reintegration of 
ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises Hutu soldiers into the army’ (International 
Crisis Group 2002:7). It still remains to be seen whether the government 
will distance itself from the authoritarian tendencies that have defined 
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RPF rule since the end of the genocide.4 Without a more equalised and 
representative governing structure, massive land reform, and a reconciliation 
process based on restorative justice, Rwanda will never be able to achieve 
stability and will once again fall victim to outbursts of violence as a way to 
rectify grievances that have come as a result of horizontal inequalities.
Moving Forward: Lessons from Malian and Rwandan Experience
The Rwandan and Malian experience can inform the way scholars and 
practitioners address post-conflict societies. These conflicts are very different 
and their levels of success are as dispersed as the trauma each society has 
faced, but while Mali can be viewed as a successful post-conflict society, 
Rwanda has a long road to travel. What makes these two conflicts alike is 
that they occurred as a result of horizontal inequalities and provide valuable 
insights as to the best approach in addressing the inequalities that have 
served as a catalyst for conflict.
Peace Agreements
The development of peace agreements is a necessary and inevitable part 
of the peace process. Accordingly, the Rwandan and the Malian peace 
process can offer some guidance when building a peace accord. First, 
the construction and enforcement of peace agreements are oftentimes 
not fluid or flexible enough when they create specific deadlines and 
obligations that are unattainable. Peace processes must have leeway built 
into them to ensure that they are as dynamic and flexible as the parties 
involved. Furthermore, the timetable that peace processes operate under 
must be realistic. Unfortunately, the international community too often 
places unrealistic time constraints on peace. Rebuilding a nation after war 
4 As a way to demonstrate the authoritarian drift the International Crisis Group shows that 
11 out of 12 prefects are affiliated with the RPF, 13 out of 15 ambassadors are RPF, 7 out of 
9 security services are headed up by the RPF, the chief prosecutor of the Court of Cessation 
and head of the Constitutional Court are all members of the RPF, 8 out of 9 Rwandan 
banks are managed by RPF members, all institutes of higher education are run by RPF 





is a time-consuming endeavour and should not be rushed for financial or 
public relations concerns. The international community must allow for 
more lenient timetables when instituting peace in war-torn nations.
Secondly, peace accords must include as many actors as possible. In the case 
of Mali, the first attempt at peace was not sustainable, in part because some 
of the major parties were excluded from the negotiations. As a way of getting 
as many of these issues resolved as possible, the international community 
and domestic interests should ensure that all belligerents and interested 
parties have a voice. 
Third, the effectiveness of a peace accord is dependent on it addressing the 
root causes of conflict. The Arusha Accords and the Tamanrasset Accords did 
not do an adequate job in dealing with the root causes of each conflict; as a 
result, their irrelevance became evident when more violence broke out. The 
National Pact in Mali did an outstanding job addressing the real grievances 
of the north and consequently was successful. The United Nations, African 
Union, United States, European Union, and other nations and groups that 
negotiate peace accords must strive to address the root causes of conflict or 
face inevitable failure. 
Fourth, oftentimes in the peace process and the subsequent development 
agenda put forth, the focus is on the individual when it should be on the group. 
When measuring success the international community looks at the number 
of individuals helped or affected. Instead, the international community and 
national policy must focus on how groups of people are being affected. This 
refocusing in the peace and development agenda is necessary because paying 
attention only to individuals does not paint a complete picture. People and 
groups are motivated to conflict when they are deprived relatively, not 
absolutely. What is often lost in looking at development and post-conflict 
progress is which groups are making progress. Therefore, when nations 
have experienced conflict, those involved in reconstruction must focus their 
efforts on rectifying the root cause of the conflict as it relates to groups. 
Fifth, the international community must show a sustained commitment 
to post-conflict societies. Oftentimes, nations emerging from conflict are 
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so economically and politically disadvantaged that they lack the ability to 
enforce the stipulations of a peace agreement. This was the case in Rwanda 
where the Arusha Accords were unable to be adhered to because of the lack 
of resources and assistance from the international community. According 
to the United Nations Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United 
Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, ‘the Rwandan people needed 
to be told that they had to rely on themselves during the interim period’ 
(United Nations 1999:7). Too often the international community creates 
complicated and expensive peace structures and then leaves the war-torn 
country to administer them. Creating peace and development is very costly 
and takes a commitment by the international community to underwrite 
the financial burden of post-conflict reconstruction. The international 
community should develop an international peace fund that will help defer 
the cost of implementing peace agreements. The current mechanism is too ad 
hoc and inconsistent to be effective. Hence, advocating for the development 
of a more sustainable and consistent source of funding is necessary. The 
fund should be administered under the auspices of the UN, be controlled 
by the General Assembly and funded though national contributions. Given 
the reluctance of nations to increase their incurred cost to the UN, the fund 
would most likely be financed though voluntary donations. The necessity 
of consistent funding and assistance is evident, and in order for peace to 
develop in conflict zones there must be a reliable source of funding for peace 
endeavours worldwide. 
Sixth, while developing the structures for peace, domestic and international 
actors must explicitly address issues of economic, social, political and refugee 
injustices. Actors must also build a framework for rectifying these issues in 
order for a nation to rebuild itself and not repeat the mistakes of the past. This 
is best exemplified in the Malian National Pact. The National Pact not only 
addressed the many issues that caused the conflict in the peace agreement, 
but the government and the northern rebels came to an agreement as to how 
to ensure that each group’s grievances and concerns were addressed. This 
type of explicit recognition and plan of action should be utilised in all peace 




While peace and stability are the ultimate goal, the international community 
and those interested in conflict resolution must understand that not all 
conflicts can be negotiated when they prefer to do it. When determining 
which conflicts the international community should spend its time and 
expertise on, they must look for what is commonly known as ‘hurting 
stalemate’. A hurting stalemate occurs when all belligerents recognise that 
the continuation of violence will not be advantageous and that negotiating 
with the enemy is the best option available. This exact situation happened in 
Mali and as a result a viable and mutually beneficial peace was struck. If there 
is not a hurting stalemate, the possibility of the international community or 
any interested party ending a conflict will be very small. In order for peace 
to take hold, all parties must see it as beneficial. In the absence of a hurting 
stalemate the international community and those in the domestic realm 
must work towards creating a hurting stalemate through either diplomatic 
or coercive means. Instead of the UN or anyone intervening in conflicts and 
failing to establish peace, the UN must choose those conflicts that are ripe 
for resolution. With regard to belligerents that see conflict as beneficial, the 
role of the UN, neutral nations, and other interested parties to facilitate the 
development of a hurting stalemate is tremendously important. 
Immediately after conflict and during the reconstruction phase, there must 
be a sustained effort to change the way people define themselves. This is 
being applied in Rwanda with abolition of ethnic identity cards. In nations 
where identity has played a crucial role in stability, as in Rwanda and Mali, 
nations must work to shift the focus away from sub-groups within the state. 
Instead, identity should be built around a national or regional consciousness, 
as is being tried in Rwanda. Moreover, nations should encourage the 
deconstruction of group identities by placing an emphasis on individual 
accountability through the development of viable economic and rule-of-law 
structures. In the case of Mali, the government was able to take a different 
approach to the problem of identity. Instead of working to integrate the 
northern populations into the larger Malian construct, they offered them a 
high amount of autonomy. This approach is possible and oftentimes easier 
to institute but can only work for groups that are already economically 
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and geographically isolated. In the case of Rwanda, group autonomy is 
impossible given geographic constraints and the level of integration before 
violence occurred. In cases of a large degree of integration, the need to create 
a new national ‘identity’ is imperative, while in nations where there is a high 
level of isolation offering varying levels of autonomy may prove easier and 
more acceptable to the populations involved. 
Truth and reconciliation
The need for a war-torn nation to develop formal mechanisms for truth, 
reconciliation and justice is widely touted as a necessary step to creating 
stability and peace. The development of truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs) has been worked into peace accords, and instituted in the former 
Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Japan, Germany, Rwanda and others. 
One of the main goals of these formal proceedings is to find the truth 
about what happened. Obviously, however, ‘truth is constituted by multiple 
facts, each of which is vulnerable to distortion, denial, rationalization and 
refutation’ (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002:588) and this makes the development 
of a common history extremely difficult. The National Pact in Mali had TRC 
mechanisms written into it so as to provide a forum for recovery; however, 
formal processes were never undertaken because the Malian people deemed 
them unnecessary. The case of Rwanda offers a good example of both a well 
and a poorly constructed TRC. One action that the international community 
should make compulsory in developing TRCs is that they should focus on 
principles of restorative justice and not on retribution. Rwanda has set up 
Gacaca courts that focus on truth telling and forgiveness as a way for the 
country to heal. Processes like Gacaca should be the cornerstones of any 
healing process utilising forgiveness and informal processes instead of 
retribution and punishment. It should be noted that the Gacaca trial is 
primarily for those who have admitted wrongdoing and who are not charged 
with the most severe crimes. In cases of genocide and massive atrocities the 





The UN in conjunction with the Rwandan government has established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for those who played 
a more integral part in the planning and implementation of the genocide.5 
This is problematic for two reasons. First, the tribunal takes place in Arusha, 
Tanzania, where the proceedings and decisions are carried out hundreds of 
miles away. Secondly, because the system of punishment established under 
the ICTR does not allow for the death penalty, many of the most responsible 
parties are subject to more lenient sentences than their compatriots.6 While 
it can be argued that those who carried out the actual murders are just as 
culpable if not more, the perceived leniency afforded the organisers of the 
genocide as well as the location of the trials are creating resentment and 
disillusionment by both the Tutsi and the Hutu. In fact, one prisoner replied, 
‘Why is it that the tribunal gives them more lenient sentences than us, they 
are the ones who told us to kill on radio…how come we are paying the 
higher price?’ (Tiemessen 2004:62) The international community should 
‘in the case of international trials…support the efficient and impartial 
administration of justice on home soil’ (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002:596). 
Instituting justice at home will provide the victims access to the proceedings 
and create a visible environment of justice throughout the country. 
In cases where there are large numbers of people held captive, the 
international community and the domestic leadership must work to ensure 
that the proceedings and accommodations are consistent with international 
human rights standards. Otherwise, those instituting justice risk becoming 
the perpetrators of injustice. This has become the case in Rwanda where more 
than a hundred thousand people are being held in substandard conditions, 
5 Please see Article 1-9 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
for a full articulation of the ICTR jurisdiction, located at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf> (Accessed 25 May 2008)
6 Article 23.1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda states, 
the penalty imposed by the trial chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. Located 
at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf> (Accessed 25 May 
2008). It should be noted that those indicted and prosecuted nationally under the 
1996 Organic Law are, depending on their level of involvement, subject to the 
death penalty.
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lack adequate nutritional support and are dying before they receive a fair 
hearing. 
With large scale atrocities and tribunals come large numbers of prisoners. As 
a result, when developing and carrying out punishments, the international 
community and domestic parties should, like those of Rwanda, use 
restorative practices as a way to defer the costs of building large numbers 
of correctional facilities. Those convicted of crimes relating to the genocide 
are, by and large, being sent to ‘work camps’ to rebuild the nation that they 
helped destroy. The idea behind this approach is that those guilty of harming 
people can atone for their actions by helping to rebuild the communities they 
have harmed. This will, in turn, aid in the nation’s recovery and demonstrate 
to the victims that the guilty are trying to make amends. International and 
domestic processes of restorative justice in punishment should be advocated 
for. 
Lastly, in carrying out truth and reconciliation and criminal trials, there 
must be accountability of all sides in order to facilitate healing. In Rwanda 
the criminal proceedings are one-sided with the Hutu génocidaires receiving 
punishment for their crimes while the RPF, who were perpetrators of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1990-1993 civil war and 
in the wake of the genocide, have eluded punishment. If the truth that is 
established or the criminal proceedings are seen as victor’s justice there will 
be no peace. Furthermore, this can quite possibly lead to more animosity, 
mistrust and conflict. Those involved in any TRC must approach the process 
of truth seeking and reconciliation on the side of impartiality and hold all 
people and groups accountable for their actions. Otherwise, they must risk 
facing the continuation of conflict.
As part of the reconciliation which is necessary for a society to heal after 
a traumatic event, one of the most important actions groups can perform 
is admitting wrongdoing. In the Malian case, the government explicitly 
admitted that the northern populations were harmed by government policy 
and that they were entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other 




helping to build trust between oppressed and oppressor. In Rwanda, neither 
the Hutu nor the Tutsi have offered an apology for the harm they have 
suffered upon each other throughout the years. The Hutu must publicly 
show remorse for the genocide they orchestrated, and the Tutsi must admit 
to the atrocities that unfolded during the civil war of the 1990s as well as 
to the pain and alienation they caused during their years of domination. 
Moreover, there must be a rhetorical and actual commitment devoted to 
the prevention of such harm in the future. Without this necessary step, trust 
will not develop, and without trust there cannot be cooperation. Admission 
and atonement are vital when healing from conflict. It demonstrates that 
the wrongdoer is aware of his/her actions and is willing to make amends 
while altering these actions. Within the context of conflict, those who have 
instigated and carried out violent acts should in all cases publicly address 
their actions. Oftentimes this must be done by all parties involved because in 
many conflicts, especially in Africa, there is blood on everyone’s hands.
Access: citizenship, property and identity
The issue of society membership and identity is a problem that must be 
addressed in order for stability to materialise. Citizenship in Rwanda and 
Mali was a major issue in post-conflict reconstruction. Citizenship was at 
the heart of both civil wars and as a result must be addressed. The issue 
of who is (as well as who is not) a citizen was also seen in South Africa, 
Côte d’Ivoire, the former Yugoslavia, and many other conflict zones around 
the world. The denial of full citizenship and the inability of all citizens to 
obtain equal access results in ‘the central state becom[ing] an arena…with 
the more powerful…groups excluding and submerging the lesser ones and 
denying their people the benefits of citizenship’ (Adejumobi 2001:162). 
Consequently, all nations must construct citizenship identities in a fair and 
equitable manner, without discrimination against race, ethnicity, religion, 
socioeconomic status, geographic location, and/or historical myth. Moreover, 
nations must abide by and enforce the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
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Africa and allow refugees to repatriate regardless of the economic, social, or 
political hardships that the nation may incur. In Rwanda for instance, if the 
Hutu government had created space for Tutsis to repatriate, then the civil 
war of the early 1990’s may not have materialised and the genocide could 
have been avoided. The international community should also play a role in 
ensuring that citizenship is a right by enforcing the refugee conventions and 
providing support to nations with highly factionalised populations. 
Along with citizenship rights, property rights remain a very contentious 
issue within post-conflict societies. This is demonstrated in both the Malian 
and the Rwandan cases. Nations must therefore strive to ensure that every 
group has an equal opportunity to access land. It is not necessary for every 
person to be granted land, but each person and group must have the ability 
to obtain property. There should be no arbitrary restrictions on land access. 
Moreover, every group within a nation must have access to the products of 
land, namely for food and economic security. Governments experiencing 
land grievances must, like that of Rwanda, reform the agrarian and land 
use policies and practices. If a nation experiences conflict as a result of land 
grievances, redistribution and equitable access to land must be explicitly 
written into the ensuing peace accord. 
Conclusion
Within the international community there has been a marked improvement 
in the number of conflicts resolved worldwide. In no other place have the 
effects of the international community and third parties been felt as much 
as in Africa. During the last decade, a number of conflicts have come to a 
close in Africa and worldwide. In fact, in the last five years conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte 
d’Ivoire have come to a close. A new chapter in African history is upon us 
– one of reconstruction, not war. The many conflicts that have ravished the 
African continent can help inform domestic and international parties as to 
how best to rebuild shattered societies. Examining the past also helps those 




future conflict. One of the most destructive and under-appreciated causes 
of violent conflict is that of horizontal inequalities. These inequalities have 
been among the causes of all of the aforementioned conflicts along with the 
two conflicts addressed in this paper. The Rwandan and the Malian conflicts 
can help practitioners develop a comprehensive strategy for nations ravished 
by horizontal inequalities. While this paper is far from comprehensive, it has 
offered policymakers and practitioners strategies to enable nations to rise 
from the ashes of conflict. The international community and those within 
the field of conflict management have the knowledge to mitigate the root 
causes of conflict. Theoretically, we as a community are well equipped; what is 
needed now is to translate the volumes of theory into an operational strategy. 
We must fill the gap between theory and practice. This gap must be bridged 
though a sustained long-term commitment of resources, both human and 
financial, in order to rectify the horizontal inequalities that are often at the 
root of so many conflicts. If action fails to materialise, the African continent 
will inevitably backtrack into the violence the international community has 
worked so hard to terminate.
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